I don't normally like to post whole articles verbatim like this, but I'm sure Mr. Schroeder and WaPo won't mind.
A Life, Wasted
Let's Stop This War Before More Heroes Are Killed
By Paul E. Schroeder
Tuesday, January 3, 2006; A17
Early on Aug. 3, 2005, we heard that 14 Marines had been killed in Haditha, Iraq. Our son, Lance Cpl. Edward "Augie" Schroeder II, was stationed there. At 10:45 a.m. two Marines showed up at our door. After collecting himself for what was clearly painful duty, the lieutenant colonel said, "Your son is a true American hero."
Since then, two reactions to Augie's death have compounded the sadness.
At times like this, people say, "He died a hero." I know this is meant with great sincerity. We appreciate the many condolences we have received and how helpful they have been. But when heard repeatedly, the phrases "he died a hero" or "he died a patriot" or "he died for his country" rub raw.
"People think that if they say that, somehow it makes it okay that he died," our daughter, Amanda, has said. "He was a hero before he died, not just because he went to Iraq. I was proud of him before, and being a patriot doesn't make his death okay. I'm glad he got so much respect at his funeral, but that didn't make it okay either."
The words "hero" and "patriot" focus on the death, not the life. They are a flag-draped mask covering the truth that few want to acknowledge openly: Death in battle is tragic no matter what the reasons for the war. The tragedy is the life that was lost, not the manner of death. Families of dead soldiers on both sides of the battle line know this. Those without family in the war don't appreciate the difference.
This leads to the second reaction. Since August we have witnessed growing opposition to the Iraq war, but it is often whispered, hands covering mouths, as if it is dangerous to speak too loudly. Others discuss the never-ending cycle of death in places such as Haditha in academic and sometimes clinical fashion, as in "the increasing lethality of improvised explosive devices."
Listen to the kinds of things that most Americans don't have to experience: The day Augie's unit returned from Iraq to Camp Lejeune, we received a box with his notebooks, DVDs and clothes from his locker in Iraq. The day his unit returned home to waiting families, we received the second urn of ashes. This lad of promise, of easy charm and readiness to help, whose highest high was saving someone using CPR as a first aid squad volunteer, came home in one coffin and two urns. We buried him in three places that he loved, a fitting irony, I suppose, but just as rough each time.
I am outraged at what I see as the cause of his death. For nearly three years, the Bush administration has pursued a policy that makes our troops sitting ducks. While Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that our policy is to "clear, hold and build" Iraqi towns, there aren't enough troops to do that.
In our last conversation, Augie complained that the cost in lives to clear insurgents was "less and less worth it," because Marines have to keep coming back to clear the same places. Marine commanders in the field say the same thing. Without sufficient troops, they can't hold the towns. Augie was killed on his fifth mission to clear Haditha.
At Augie's grave, the lieutenant colonel knelt in front of my wife and, with tears in his eyes, handed her the folded flag. He said the only thing he could say openly: "Your son was a true American hero." Perhaps. But I felt no glory, no honor. Doing your duty when you don't know whether you will see the end of the day is certainly heroic. But even more, being a hero comes from respecting your parents and all others, from helping your neighbors and strangers, from loving your spouse, your children, your neighbors and your enemies, from honesty and integrity, from knowing when to fight and when to walk away, and from understanding and respecting the differences among the people of the world.
Two painful questions remain for all of us. Are the lives of Americans being killed in Iraq wasted? Are they dying in vain? President Bush says those who criticize staying the course are not honoring the dead. That is twisted logic: honor the fallen by killing another 2,000 troops in a broken policy?
I choose to honor our fallen hero by remembering who he was in life, not how he died. A picture of a smiling Augie in Iraq, sunglasses turned upside down, shows his essence -- a joyous kid who could use any prop to make others feel the same way.
Though it hurts, I believe that his death -- and that of the other Americans who have died in Iraq -- was a waste. They were wasted in a belief that democracy would grow simply by removing a dictator -- a careless misunderstanding of what democracy requires. They were wasted by not sending enough troops to do the job needed in the resulting occupation -- a careless disregard for professional military counsel.
But their deaths will not be in vain if Americans stop hiding behind flag-draped hero masks and stop whispering their opposition to this war. Until then, the lives of other sons, daughters, husbands, wives, fathers and mothers may be wasted as well.
This is very painful to acknowledge, and I have to live with it. So does President Bush.
The writer is managing director of a trade development firm in Cleveland.
Tuesday, January 03, 2006
Monday, January 02, 2006
From the Brave New World Dictionary (alternate edition)
More Dubya Talk Exposed
We've covered most of this ground in earlier Pen and Sword and ePluribus articles, but John at Americablog gives us a concise list of why claims that Mister Bush has made America safer are pure Bush-ido.
Time and Newsweek on the Three Ring Power Circus
Time and Newsweek are both running cover stories on the looming debate over wartime separation of powers that was sparked by the National Security Agency domestic spying scandal. As we noted before Christmas at ePluribus Media Journal in "Smoke, Mirrors and War Powers," the actions and decisions made over the NSA issue may determine the nature of the separation of powers among the legislative, executive and judicial branches of our federal government for decades — and centuries — to come.
The Crux of the Issue
Over the past week, the administration and its supporters have based their claims of "plenary" (absolute) executive wartime authority on two documents: the U.S. Constitution and the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) that Congress passed in 2001 the week after the 9/11 attacks.
To make a convincing case that Mr. Bush has virtually unlimited war powers based on the Constitution alone might take an extraordinary piece of lawyering. Article II makes the President commander in chief of the military, and allows him to make treaties, but only with consent of two thirds of the Senate. As enumerated constitutional executive war powers go, that's about it. One can find any number of mentions of sweeping executive war powers in legislation and judicial opinion, but citing statutes and case law is like taking a stroll through a cherry orchard. You can pick whatever flavor suits your taste. For every allusion to the notion that a President has unquestionable decision-making power in time of war, you'll find another one that says he doesn't.
That's where the 2001 AUMF comes in. Among other things, that legislation empowered Mr. Bush to:
The AUMF also states:
Hence, Congress finds itself in an embarrassing situation. It granted Mr. Bush inferred constitutional powers to fight terrorism, as well as authorizing him to use "all necessary and appropriate force."
The Three Ring Circus Act
Congress will play the "legislative intent" card, and will argue that the term "appropriate force" was intended to bar Mr. Bush from exceeding his constitutional powers.
The administration will counter by saying Mr. Bush had constitutional power to do whatever he determined necessary to fight terrorism because Congress said he did when it passed the AUMF. The debate will go around and around until it augurs into the graveyard of the public's attention span or winds up in the Supreme Court.
At that point, the Court would face a number of less than desirable options. If it refuses to hear the case, Chief Justice John Roberts will be accused of siding with the man who put him in his job. Taking the case and ruling in favor of Mr. Bush would produce the same result. If the court took the case and ruled that the AUMF was an unconstitutional law, it would reverse an earlier recent decision in which it recognized the AUMF's legitimacy.
In the case of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the high court ruled that the AUMF's "necessary and appropriate force" language gave Mr. Bush authority to hold an American citizen in detention as an "enemy combatant."
Compared to holding U.S. citizens in prison without trial, what's a little spying on them amount to? And if a President can imprison and spy on citizens under authority of the AUMF, what else can't he do?
Branches and Sequels
There are, of course, other possible outcomes. The Supreme Court might rule, for example, that certain types of intelligence gathering are not allowed by the AUMF without court orders. Or the Congress could rewrite the AUMF to place specific restrictions on the President's authorities in his conduct of the Global War on Terror. They could even repeal the AUMF entirely.
But any direct action by the legislature and the judiciary to limit Mr. Bush's powers could have a devastating backlash effect. If any further terror attacks of 9/11 magnitude take place on American soil, the other two branches of government will be accused of having handcuffed the President, and any subsequent attempts at curbing executive powers will be doomed to failure in the court of public opinion.
The Crux of the Issue
Over the past week, the administration and its supporters have based their claims of "plenary" (absolute) executive wartime authority on two documents: the U.S. Constitution and the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) that Congress passed in 2001 the week after the 9/11 attacks.
To make a convincing case that Mr. Bush has virtually unlimited war powers based on the Constitution alone might take an extraordinary piece of lawyering. Article II makes the President commander in chief of the military, and allows him to make treaties, but only with consent of two thirds of the Senate. As enumerated constitutional executive war powers go, that's about it. One can find any number of mentions of sweeping executive war powers in legislation and judicial opinion, but citing statutes and case law is like taking a stroll through a cherry orchard. You can pick whatever flavor suits your taste. For every allusion to the notion that a President has unquestionable decision-making power in time of war, you'll find another one that says he doesn't.
That's where the 2001 AUMF comes in. Among other things, that legislation empowered Mr. Bush to:
…use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons."
The AUMF also states:
"… the President has authority under the Constitution to take action to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States[.]"
Hence, Congress finds itself in an embarrassing situation. It granted Mr. Bush inferred constitutional powers to fight terrorism, as well as authorizing him to use "all necessary and appropriate force."
The Three Ring Circus Act
Congress will play the "legislative intent" card, and will argue that the term "appropriate force" was intended to bar Mr. Bush from exceeding his constitutional powers.
The administration will counter by saying Mr. Bush had constitutional power to do whatever he determined necessary to fight terrorism because Congress said he did when it passed the AUMF. The debate will go around and around until it augurs into the graveyard of the public's attention span or winds up in the Supreme Court.
At that point, the Court would face a number of less than desirable options. If it refuses to hear the case, Chief Justice John Roberts will be accused of siding with the man who put him in his job. Taking the case and ruling in favor of Mr. Bush would produce the same result. If the court took the case and ruled that the AUMF was an unconstitutional law, it would reverse an earlier recent decision in which it recognized the AUMF's legitimacy.
In the case of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the high court ruled that the AUMF's "necessary and appropriate force" language gave Mr. Bush authority to hold an American citizen in detention as an "enemy combatant."
Compared to holding U.S. citizens in prison without trial, what's a little spying on them amount to? And if a President can imprison and spy on citizens under authority of the AUMF, what else can't he do?
Branches and Sequels
There are, of course, other possible outcomes. The Supreme Court might rule, for example, that certain types of intelligence gathering are not allowed by the AUMF without court orders. Or the Congress could rewrite the AUMF to place specific restrictions on the President's authorities in his conduct of the Global War on Terror. They could even repeal the AUMF entirely.
But any direct action by the legislature and the judiciary to limit Mr. Bush's powers could have a devastating backlash effect. If any further terror attacks of 9/11 magnitude take place on American soil, the other two branches of government will be accused of having handcuffed the President, and any subsequent attempts at curbing executive powers will be doomed to failure in the court of public opinion.
Sunday, January 01, 2006
NSA: an Interesting Twist
Something from NYT worth noting before it drops off the radar:
This may be a minor aside in the larger story, but it's worth noting that somebody fairly high up in the Bush administration--James Comey, who was acting Attorney General while Ashcroft was hospitalized--said "I'm not so sure about this."
Comey declined to talk to the Times about this story, and Gonzales couldn't be reached.
Hmm. What does NSA do when they can't reach Gonzales to get permission for warrantless spying?
#
John Bolton's still buried somewhere in this story. Think he'll pop up on the surface anytime soon?
Justice Deputy Resisted Parts of Spy Program
By ERIC LICHTBLAU and JAMES RISEN
WASHINGTON, Dec. 31 - A top Justice Department official objected in 2004 to aspects of the National Security Agency's domestic surveillance program and refused to sign on to its continued use amid concerns about its legality and oversight, according to officials with knowledge of the tense internal debate. The concerns appear to have played a part in the temporary suspension of the secret program.
The concerns prompted two of President Bush's most senior aides - Andrew H. Card Jr., his chief of staff, and Alberto R. Gonzales, then White House counsel and now attorney general - to make an emergency visit to a Washington hospital in March 2004 to discuss the program's future and try to win the needed approval from Attorney General John Ashcroft, who was hospitalized for gallbladder surgery, the officials said.
This may be a minor aside in the larger story, but it's worth noting that somebody fairly high up in the Bush administration--James Comey, who was acting Attorney General while Ashcroft was hospitalized--said "I'm not so sure about this."
Comey declined to talk to the Times about this story, and Gonzales couldn't be reached.
Hmm. What does NSA do when they can't reach Gonzales to get permission for warrantless spying?
#
John Bolton's still buried somewhere in this story. Think he'll pop up on the surface anytime soon?
Saturday, December 31, 2005
Neo-speak
The next time you hear Mister Bush or someone else from his extended royal court say the word "Islamofacism," think of George Orwell's 1984. In one of my favorite passages, Winston Smith has asked his "friend" Syme how his work on the Newspeak Dictionary is coming.
Think "with us or against us," "cut and run," "total victory" and the hundreds of other mantras we hear from Bush administration echo chamberlains that deny any subtlety of thought.
Like I always say: Rovewellian!
'The Eleventh Edition is the definitive edition,' [Syme] said. 'We're getting the language into its final shape -- the shape it's going to have when nobody speaks anything else. When we've finished with it, people like you will have to learn it all over again. You think, I dare say, that our chief job is inventing new words. But not a bit of it! We're destroying words -- scores of them, hundreds of them, every day. We're cutting the language down to the bone. The Eleventh Edition won't contain a single word that will become obsolete before the year 2050.'
[…]
'You haven't a real appreciation of Newspeak, Winston,' he said almost sadly. 'Even when you write it you're still thinking in Oldspeak. I've read some of those pieces that you write in The Times occasionally. They're good enough, but they're translations. In your heart you'd prefer to stick to Oldspeak, with all its vagueness and its useless shades of meaning. You don't grasp the beauty of the destruction of words. Do you know that Newspeak is the only language in the world whose vocabulary gets smaller every year?
[…]
'Don't you see that the whole aim of Newspeak is to narrow the range of thought? In the end we shall make thoughtcrime literally impossible, because there will be no words in which to express it. Every concept that can ever be needed, will be expressed by exactly one word, with its meaning rigidly defined and all its subsidiary meanings rubbed out and forgotten.
Think "with us or against us," "cut and run," "total victory" and the hundreds of other mantras we hear from Bush administration echo chamberlains that deny any subtlety of thought.
Like I always say: Rovewellian!
Power Games: the Coming Constitutional Crisis
The National Security Agency spy scandal may be the seminal event that triggers a showdown among the three branches of government over separation of powers. Under the secret program, Mr. Bush and Attorney General Alberto Gonzales allegedly authorized electronic surveillance of U.S. citizens and other legal residents who are entitled to privacy rights under the Constitution.
As Scott Shane of the New York Times explains:
But the administration insists that it has acted within the bounds of Mister Bush's executive authority.
The congressional resolution Shane refers to was the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) passed by both houses of the legislature on September 18, 2001. That act constituted "specific statutory authorization" under the War Powers Resolution of 1973 for Mr. Bush to take certain actions in what has come to be known as the Global War on Terror. Most notably, he was authorized to "use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons."
NSA's domestic surveillance isn't the only questionable activity of the executive branch that the administration has claimed legal authority to conduct under the Constitution and the AUMF.
On December 30, 2005, Dana Priest of The Washington Post reported on the ambitious CIA program Mr. Bush authorized after 9/11.
Priest explains that as with the NSA controversy, the administration defends the GST program as being consistent with the authority granted it in the September '01 AUMF.
(In backchannel correspondence, Ms. Priest clarified that the anonymous official was referring to the AUMF when used the term "war powers act.")
Ultimately, the administration's claims to "plenary" or "absolute" wartime powers to legitimize anything the executive branch has done in its conduct of the Global War on Terror will rest in the AUMF, and in light of that piece of legislation, the legislative and judiciary branches will have a tough time reigning in Mr. Bush's claims to sweeping authorities as a wartime Commander in Chief.
Coming in Power Games Part II: the dynamics of separations of power in the Global War on Terror.
As Scott Shane of the New York Times explains:
The program, whose existence was revealed in an article in The New York Times on Dec. 16, has provoked sharp criticism from civil liberties groups, some members of Congress and some former intelligence officials who believe that it circumvents the law governing national security eavesdropping.
But the administration insists that it has acted within the bounds of Mister Bush's executive authority.
President Bush and Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales have vigorously defended the program as a legal, critical defense against terrorism that has helped prevent attacks in this country. They say Mr. Bush's executive order authorizing the program is constitutional as part of his powers as commander in chief and under the resolution passed by Congress days after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. That resolution authorized the use of force against terrorists.
The congressional resolution Shane refers to was the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) passed by both houses of the legislature on September 18, 2001. That act constituted "specific statutory authorization" under the War Powers Resolution of 1973 for Mr. Bush to take certain actions in what has come to be known as the Global War on Terror. Most notably, he was authorized to "use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons."
NSA's domestic surveillance isn't the only questionable activity of the executive branch that the administration has claimed legal authority to conduct under the Constitution and the AUMF.
On December 30, 2005, Dana Priest of The Washington Post reported on the ambitious CIA program Mr. Bush authorized after 9/11.
The broad-based effort, known within the agency by the initials GST, is compartmentalized into dozens of highly classified individual programs, details of which are known mainly to those directly involved.
GST includes programs allowing the CIA to capture al Qaeda suspects with help from foreign intelligence services, to maintain secret prisons abroad, to use interrogation techniques that some lawyers say violate international treaties, and to maintain a fleet of aircraft to move detainees around the globe. Other compartments within GST give the CIA enhanced ability to mine international financial records and eavesdrop on suspects anywhere in the world.
Priest explains that as with the NSA controversy, the administration defends the GST program as being consistent with the authority granted it in the September '01 AUMF.
"Everything is done in the name of self-defense, so they can do anything because nothing is forbidden in the war powers act," said one official who was briefed on the CIA's original cover program and who is skeptical of its legal underpinnings. "It's an amazing legal justification that allows them to do anything," said the official, who like others spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issues.
(In backchannel correspondence, Ms. Priest clarified that the anonymous official was referring to the AUMF when used the term "war powers act.")
Ultimately, the administration's claims to "plenary" or "absolute" wartime powers to legitimize anything the executive branch has done in its conduct of the Global War on Terror will rest in the AUMF, and in light of that piece of legislation, the legislative and judiciary branches will have a tough time reigning in Mr. Bush's claims to sweeping authorities as a wartime Commander in Chief.
Coming in Power Games Part II: the dynamics of separations of power in the Global War on Terror.
Friday, December 30, 2005
NSA Probe: Not So Fast
The Justice Department's recently announced investigation on NSA domestic spying is not aimed at probing wrongdoing by the intelligence agency. Instead, as reported by Fox News and other sources, it is aimed at discovering who leaked the existence of a program that may have violated the Fourth Amendment and other individual protections provided for in the Constitution.
The Fourth Amendment affirms:
#
In other words, the Justice Department is not looking to discover whether an agency of the executive branch violated the law by spying on United States persons whose civil liberties are covered under the FISA laws.
Chapter 36 of U.S. Code defines a "United States person" as…
Lamentably, public discourse over whether Messrs. Bush and Gonzalez violated the law will likely be drowned out by the noise over who snitched on them.
The Fourth Amendment affirms:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
#
In other words, the Justice Department is not looking to discover whether an agency of the executive branch violated the law by spying on United States persons whose civil liberties are covered under the FISA laws.
Chapter 36 of U.S. Code defines a "United States person" as…
…a citizen of the United States, an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence (as defined in section 1101 (a)(20) of title 8), an unincorporated association a substantial number of members of which are citizens of the United States or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or a corporation which is incorporated in the United States, but does not include a corporation or an association which is a foreign power, as defined in subsection (a)(1), (2), or (3) of this section.
Lamentably, public discourse over whether Messrs. Bush and Gonzalez violated the law will likely be drowned out by the noise over who snitched on them.
NSA Investigation: Foxes and Hen Houses
Just heard on MSNBC that the Justice Department will launch an investigation on the NSA spying issue. Here we go again, the foxes investigating the break in of the hen house.
Hopefully, American's will recall that one of the lawyers who reviewed and approved the NSA's activities was none other than current Attorney General Alberto Gonzales.
Hopefully, American's will recall that one of the lawyers who reviewed and approved the NSA's activities was none other than current Attorney General Alberto Gonzales.
Thursday, December 29, 2005
The Cookie Monsters
If you haven't seen it yet, here's the Associated Press story in the New York Times about the cookies in the NSA web site.
This begs a pair of questions. If NSA is being careless about features in their software, how careless are they being in all the other aspects of their operations? Moreover, what does it say about government oversight when it takes a privacy advocacy group to catch a secret government agency breaking the law?
But there may be an even more important question. Who's making up the rules?
Are rules for use of persistent cookies by federal agencies really being made by the executive branch's Office of Management and Budget? And what senior official has to sign off for their use? Whatever GS-12 happens to be around?
The National Security Agency's Internet site has been placing files on visitors' computers that can track their Web surfing activity despite strict federal rules banning most files of that type.
The files, known as cookies, disappeared after a privacy activist complained and The Associated Press made inquiries this week. Agency officials acknowledged yesterday that they had made a mistake.
Nonetheless, the issue raised questions about privacy at the agency, which is on the defensive over reports of an eavesdropping program.
"Considering the surveillance power the N.S.A. has, cookies are not exactly a major concern," said Ari Schwartz, associate director at the Center for Democracy and Technology, a privacy advocacy group in Washington. "But it does show a general lack of understanding about privacy rules when they are not even following the government's very basic rules for Web privacy."
Until Tuesday, the N.S.A. site created two cookie files that do not expire until 2035.
Don Weber, an agency spokesman, said in a statement yesterday that the use of the so-called persistent cookies resulted from a recent software upgrade.
This begs a pair of questions. If NSA is being careless about features in their software, how careless are they being in all the other aspects of their operations? Moreover, what does it say about government oversight when it takes a privacy advocacy group to catch a secret government agency breaking the law?
But there may be an even more important question. Who's making up the rules?
In a 2003 memorandum, the Office of Management and Budget at the White House prohibited federal agencies from using persistent cookies - those that are not automatically deleted right away - unless there is a "compelling need."
A senior official must sign off on any such use, and an agency that uses them must disclose and detail their use in its privacy policy.
Are rules for use of persistent cookies by federal agencies really being made by the executive branch's Office of Management and Budget? And what senior official has to sign off for their use? Whatever GS-12 happens to be around?
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)